Elucidating the behavior
Russia likewise will not see the rebirth of the Tsarist Empire with Orthodox Christian tradition as official ideology.
We are a multi - ethnic society with a growing proportion of Islamic population. It is also worth noting in addition that, while liberals are a numerical minority in Russia, they are disproportionately influential: the Russian government is controlled by moderates, with Dmitry Medvedev as their head.
But with the desertion of this class to the ranks of protesters, we are seeing a shift, and finally the true Putin is making his worldview known.
But Putin’s steps should not be interpreted as winding the clock back.
Putin’s conservative ideas by and large do not transgress the limits of the moderate form of Western type state or nation building.
This kind of the conservative is not too radical, nor excessive.
Conservatives value the traditions of established religions (above all, the Russian Orthodoxy); soveriegn foreign policy; and the guarding of Russia’s great-power status.
For his first twelve years in power, Mr Putin’s inherent conservativism was been tempered by the need to appeal to a significant and influential liberal elite.
In Russia conservatives tend to favor Left-ish, state-centric, economic models.
Much power is in the hands of hyper wealthy oligarch class, who are by and large adherents of liberals ideas.
If we put together all these facts, the conservative thrust of Mr Putin’s presidency leads in the direction of pragmatic syncretism: it is conservative only in the sense that it doesn’t share globalist optimism, but it is also not trying to guard an exhausted status quo.
The expression “balance of power” gives us the key to understand Putin’s version of conservatism that will define the Russian politics during third and presumably fourth Presidential terms.
He will pursue the national interest, the acquisition of regional and eventual world scale power, protectionism and mercantilism.